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an equitable formula to apply where the proceeds were insufficient to
pay all liens. The first step was to total the amounts of the mortgage liens
and those of judgment lienholders, deducting from the total the amount, of
state taxes. Then a proportionate amount of the state taxes is deducted from
each lien. In paying out, the order provides: 1) Payment of costs, 2) payment of state taxes (unless the fund is insufficient to pay f~deral taxes),
3) payment of the lien of the mortgagee, after deduction of the pro rata part
of the state taxes, 4) payment of the lien of judgment lienholders, after a
pro rata deduction of state taxes, 5) payment of the lien of the United
States for federal taxes, or so -much as remains undistributed of the proceeds
of the judicial sale.
MAURUCE S. CULP

TORTS
Scholars and "practical" men alike have been trying for some time now
to define the essential nature of a tort. The wisdom of a few, born of the
trial and error of the many, persuades that the effort is fruitless.1 Such
definitions can only perpetuate what has been; they can not tell us very
much about what will be, at least in the sphere of human behavior,, which
is more or less the province of the law of torts. But the many keep on
looking for definitions to guide their way, oftentimes ignoring the source
of the definition, in fact the source of all our words and combinations of
words in the world about us. Words become the master and the judge, and
mere men must fall where words will throw them. Very good men often
come under this very strong fascination.
Words made known their mastery in the reported cases for 1955, at
least in that area labelled "torts." The most disturbing decision involved
the at-tempt of an employee to recover for his loss caused in part by the
alleged trickery of his employer. In Greenwalt v. The Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.,2 an employee alleged that his employer represented to him
that it would file his application for workmen's compensation with the
Industrial Commission, that his employer withheld the application and
paid him $22.50 a week for two years as if pursuant to legal requirements
and that at the end of two years the employer stopped payment. Any
possible recovery by the employee from the Industrial Commission was
barred by the two year statute of limitations. Claiming permanent injuries
and diminution of earning capacity, the employee sought to recover from
1

PpossER, ToRTs, § 1 (2d ed. 1955).
'164 Ohio St. 1, 128 N.E.2d 116 (1955).

WESTERN RESERVE lAW REVIEW

Uun

the employer under a theory of fraud. The Supreme Court, in a four to
three decision, barred the only remaining path, sending the employee home
with the good news that the employer would probably be deprived of its
self-insurer status by the Industrial Commission if the employee's allegations were true. The majority felt its decision was compelled by the proviso in the Ohio Constitution to the effect that compensation under the
workmen's compensation scheme "Shall be in lieu of all other rights to
compensation or damages... " Experts in word manipulation should
find no such compulsion. A first year law student could find his way
out of the court's verbal corner. The simple question to be faced is
whether this particular employee should go without his fll day in court
in his attempt to gain compensation for his hurt from a large body of
stockholders represented by some apparently scheming, unfeeling men.
If "justice" has any meaning at all, it suffers here. Administrative convenience or word magic, either way, the result is not compelled and cer4
tainly not desirable.
Words often play strange tricks in cases of statutory interpretation.
Such a case is Hirschauerv. Davis,5 involving the Ohio dog statute.6 This
was an action by the owner of a tractor-trailer outfit for damage sustained
when the driver of the outfit swerved to avoid defendant's dog which had
started to cross a highway near defendant's farm home. The right front
wheel of the trailer struck the dog, and the outfit ultimately overturned in
a ditch, destroying the outfit and its load of concrete pipe. The dog statute
provides simply enough that "The owner or keeper (of a dog) shall be
liable for any damage or injuries caused by . . . (the) . . . dog." The
Supreme Court ruled that the statute provided for absolute liability. But
almost everyone knows that absolute liability does not mean liability for
everything actually caused. There are some limits.7 The court itself apparently recognized this truth by saying that the jury should be charged to
the effect that the owner of the dog would be liable for all damages
proximately caused, for "causation" is a broader classification than "proximate causation." Yet the court in no way attempted to set the limits
of liability. Instead, the nebulous notion of proximate cause was given to
the jury. This would be well enough if the jury could be trusted not to
sOmIo

CoNsT. Art I1

35.

'Another plaintiff found that the damages flowing from the alleged trickery of a
doctor must be sued for within the one year period provided by the "malpractice"
statute of limitations. Swankowski v. Diethelm, 57 Ohio Op. 312, 129 N.E.2d 182
(Ohio App. 1953).
'163 Ohio Sr. 105, 126 N.E.2d 337 (1955).
'OHIO R v. CODE 5 955.28.
'PRossER, op cit. supra, § 60.

'Id. 544.
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be diverted by the sheer technicality of those words. But even more,
the possibility of the liability of the owner in this situation seems preposterous. What an extreme price the owner may have to pay for letting
the dog live a dog's life. Better perhaps to require the driver to run over
the dog - much as another portion of the dog statute permits the killing
of a dog if it is worrying sheep. The doctrine of absolute liability.precludes any consideration of contributory negligence, howe~er. Who can
say that the legislators would know that their ayes were so powerful, so
loaded with meaning. The Supreme Court thought the wording of the
statute "clear." What seems to be needed in this statute is a little less
"clarity" so the court can return -to its true judicial function of facing
life issues rather than manipulating formulas.
False Imprisonment
There was at least one bright spot during the year. A most important
problem was resolved in favor of the law enforcement agencies of the
state in Johnson v. Reddy.9 The Pennsylvania State Police requested the
Cleveland police to check on a named individual residing at a certain
address in Cleveland. The Cleveland police investigated and reported
they had found the named person. The Cleveland police were then requested to take the person into custody and were notified that warrants
had been issued and that extradition was desired. The Cleveland police immediately arrested the plaintiff without a warrant, despite some variance in
description and a different middle initial from that designated by the
Pennsylvania police. A complete description of plaintiff including fingerprints was forwarded to Pennsylvania. Plaintiff was not the wanted man.
Upon his release he sued for false arrest. The Supreme Court held that
as a matter of law the arrest was properly made under the Uniform Extradition Act.' 0 As provided under the code for strictly intra-state arrests,
an Ohio police officer may make an arrest under the Extradition Act without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged
of a felony in the charging state.'" The court set the future pattern with
these words: "All reasonable doubts concerning the reasonablness of the
information on which the arresting officer acts should be resolved in his
favor."
Imputed Contributory Negligence
Ross v. Burgan 12 should prove of interest to those husbands who regis'163 Ohio St 347, 126 N.E.2d 911 (1955).
OHIo REV. CoDE S 2963.12.,
n OHio

REv. CoDE

§ 2935.04.

'2163 Ohio St. 211, 126 N..2d 592 (1955).
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ter their ears in their wives' names. The plaintiff sued for damages caused
her by the combined negligence of her husband and defendant. Reviewing the authorities and finding a split on the question, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the best approach where the owner-wife was riding with
the driver-husband was to presume that the husband was acting as the
wife's agent, absent any evidence to the contrary. The Court does not
say what would prove sufficient rebutting evidence to prevent the imputation of contributory negligence.
Negligence
Another round was fought in the pedestrian versus municipality, defective sidewalk series' 3 in Griffin v. City of Cincinnati.4 In this case
the plaintiff stumbled over an abrupt two inch elevation located immediately adjacent to a triangular hole in the sidewalk. In affirming a jury
finding for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that although such an
elevation by itself would not be enough to constitute a jury question, the
addition of a triangular hole brought the problem within the province of
the jury on the question of qualified nuisance.' 5 Three judges dissented.
Their feeling was that such a case was too speculative for jury consideration. Their expressed fear was that municipalities would become insurers.
Certainly we shall see more of these cases, for it seems improbable that any
mechanical, yet reasonable, rule can be laid down by the Supreme Court
to cover such situations.
A court of common pleas decision also gives some promise of controversy in coming years. In Garbo v. Walker' 6 it was held that the possible
liability of defendant for leaving his keys in the ignition of his car, with
resultant damage to plaintiff through the attempts of a thief of the car to
escape, was for the jury. This is apparently the first time such a case has
arisen in Ohio. The court cites as a reason for its decision a Cleveland
ordinance i forbidding the leaving of keys in the ignition of a car on a
street or highway. From the court's language, however, it seems that the
actual rationale of the case may be simply the familiar formula of common law negligence.
An interesting problem on the proof of negligence arose in a court
"See 6 WEST. RES. L. REV. 317 (1955) for discussion of a case holding that the
failure to repair a defect in the sidewalk of three-fourths inches was as a matter of
law not negligence on the part of a municipality.
1,162 Ohio St. 232, 123 N.E.2d 11 (1954).
"Under OHIO REv .CoDe § 723.01.
"129 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
1

ORDINANc

land.

No. 1203-A-46 a.n.a. 9.0936 certified ordinances of the City of Cleve-
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of appeals case, Flook v. Kemp.18 'Plaintiff sued-defendant i&negligeiice
in driving into plaintiff's automobile. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
failed to bring his car to a halt at a stop sign and failed to maintain a
proper lookout ahead for plaintiff's automobile travelling on a through
highway. The only direct testimony by plaintiff was that he experienced
a flash, I jar and a sound and woke up in the hospital. A 'witness for
plaintiff testified among other matters that plaintiff's car was quite badly
damaged and that plaintiff lay upon the ground in a dazed condition. The
court held that this evidence would reasonably support plaintiff's allegations. This is well enough, but the court went on to say that if the evidence
did not support a finding of negligence then the doctrine of res ipsa loqudtur applied in plaintiff's favor. As that doctrine is usually understood,
it is involved in situations where there is a probability of negligence on
'the part of defendant. The doctrine is not a substitute for a finding of
19
negligence.
Several cases arose involving the definition of the duty of care owed
in varying fact situations and relationships. In Schwarz v.The General
Electric Realty Corp.20 the Supreme Court once again held that the duty
of due care owed by the owner of premises to the employees of an independent contractor hired to do work on the premises is very much limited
by the obligations of the independent contractor. In this case the plaintiffemployee was hurt via indirect contact with high tension wires running
over defendant's property. According to the court, the duty of warning
plaintiff, if owed by anybody, was owed by plaintiff's employer, an inde.
pendent contractor, who was or should have been fully aware of the hazard.
In Anaple v. The Standard Oil Co.21 the Supreme Court held that the
operator of a lubritorium owes no duty to customers to prevent or remove
grease spots no larger than five inches and located immediately outside the
door of the lubritorium. 22 Noting that some different precautions might
be required in those portions of a station where a customer ordinarily pays
his bill, the court indicated that one of the reasons for its ruling was a concern over the possible financial burden of a stricter rule upon independent
operators.
In Floyd v.City of ClevelandP a court of appeals held that it was neglis125 N.E.2d 739 (Ohio App. 1953).
The court did not discuss the possible inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur where
there are specific allegations of negligence in the petition.
w163 Ohio St. 354, 126 N.E.2d 906 (1955).
' 162 Ohio St. 537, 124 N.X.2d 128 (1955).
'This decision was anticipated in Parras v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 315, 116
N.E.2d 300 (1954). See 6 WasT. RES. L REv. 314 (1955).
" 123 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio App. 1955).
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gence for the operator of a trolley to leave an epileptic passenger alone with
other passengers. The operator in this case had gone to call an ambulance.
In his absence, the epileptic regained consciousness and struck the plaintiff
who was also a passenger. This is an unusual application of the old rule
that a carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care. It may be
that such a rule puts an operator in a dilemma. Should he protect his
passengers or get help for the epileptic? In either event -the operator is
probably wrong, that is, legally wrong, which does not necessarily mean
morally wrong.
A case of interest to landlords and tenants of converted two-family type
dwellings is Weston v. David. 4 The duty of care owed by a landlord to
his tenant turns upon the portion of the premises involved. In that portion
of the premises under the exclusive control of the tenant, the landlord owes
no tort duty to maintain the premises. This court of appeals decision
involved the finding that a stairway leading to plaintiff-tenant's upstairs
rooms was not within the exclusive control of the tenant. The significant
factor in the case is the apparent underlying reasoning that the landlord's
responsibilities increase as his agreement with the tenant becomes more
indefinite and uncertain. Apparently the landlord must dearly establish
that the portion of the premises involved was intended to be under the
exclusive control of the tenant if the landlord wishes to avoid responsibility.
Aviation
Of considerable interest to the aviation industry .is Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Company25 decided in the federal court system in
Ohio. A very complicated fact situation was reduced to the seemingly
simple negligence formulas. The plaintiff airline purchased certain airplanes from the defendant manufacturer. These airplanes proved to be
defective, resulting in heavy damages to the airline. The theory of plaintiff's suit was necessarily in negligence since defendant had disclaimed all
warranties. Defendant's theory was that plaintiff was contributorily negligent since plaintiff had supplied an inspection team to be on hand during
the manufacturing stages of the airplanes. According to defendant, plaintiff should, with the use of reasonable care, have discovered the defects involved. The court ruled simply that since there was no evidence that the
defendant in any way relied upon plaintiff's inspections, plaintiff in no
way increased the risk of damage to itself; therefore as a matter of law
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Conceivably the court might
2

,128 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio App. 1954).
m224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955).
The case is fully discussed at 7 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 206 (1956).

